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In this paper, I investigate the Bank of Japan's monetary policy effects under
Abenomics at the initial stage. First, I describe briefly what is “Abenomics” and
“New monetary policy under Abenomics” since April 2013. I also examine the
causes of the sharp response of the yen and Japanese stock prices, the increase
of consumer price index and the change of the public's expectations for
economic activity and prices on surveys. In the second part I explain why the
new monetary policy was effective in 2013, comparing the previous policy until
2012. Although there is not so big difference between monetary policies before
and after 2012 theoretically, I point out the importance of the strong com-
mitment by central bank, the cooperation with the government and
“psychological impact” on public. The third part discusses the durability of the
new monetary policy. The policy effects will be sustainable if a price becomes
lastingly positive, which needs a durably positive output gap. Therefore, growth
strategy by Abenomics plays an important role. I also point out that the BOJ has
to perform the policy over side effects such as the impact on the government
bond markets, the impact on other financial market and an outflow of money
to overseas. 
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One year has passed since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took
power in late 2012. The economic policies of the Abe administra-
tion (so-called Abenomics, same hereafter) seem to have done well.
1. This paper is based on my lecture at a seminar entitled Towards the end of deflation in Japan?:
Monetary policy and the role of the central bank, which was held at L'Institut d'Asie Orientale (IAO)
at l'École Normale Supérieure de Lyon on May 31, 2013.Revue de l’OFCE / Analyse et prévisions – 135 (2014)
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markets and the real economy, and the public's expectations for
economic activity and prices are improving thanks to the Abeno-
mics. Especially, the “New monetary policy under Abenomics”
plays an important role in stimulating the economy. For 2013,
Japan seems to have positively surprised the world.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the potential
benefits and risks of the Bank of Japan (BOJ, same hereafter)’s new
policy under Abenomics, which has been labeled “monetary
easing of a different dimension” according to BOJ themselves, and
which has been described as a revolution of monetary policy in
financial market. 
This paper is divided into five sections. First, the section 1
surveys Abenomics and “New monetary policy” under Abenomics.
It also assesses the effects of New monetary policy at the initial
stage. Section 2 considers why the new monetary policy was effec-
tive, comparing the previous policy until 2012. Section 3 discusses
the issues from a long-term viewpoint. The durability of the policy,
the overcoming of deflation, and unexpected problems caused by
the New policy are discussed. Section 4 examines the relation
between the central bank and government. Finally, Section 5
provides conclusion.
1. New monetary policy under Abenomics
(1) Abenomics
The Prime Minister Abe advocates economic policy package
plan to overcome deflation and achieve economic growth.2 His
policy consists of three policy arrows;3 that is, 
— The BOJ conducts “Bold Monetary Easing” to achieve the
price stability target of 2 percent at the earliest possible time
through the monetary easing. Further, in January 2013, the
2. Prime Minister Abe intends to achieve a higher growth rate of GDP by around 3 percent in
nominal terms and around 2 percent in real terms in the late 2010s.
3. It is a famous legend in Japan. During 16th century, prominent daimyo, Mōri Motonari had
three sons, whom he encouraged to work together. In one instance, he handed each of his sons
an arrow and asked each snap it. After each snapped his arrow, Motonari produced three arrows
and asked his sons to snap all three at once. When they were unable to do so, Motonari
explained that one arrow could be broken easily, but three arrows held together could not.
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they would pursue “policy cooperation” to try to end
deflation.
— The government expands public investment to create real
demand and employment. Public investment has been
increasing mainly on the back of the emergency economic
measures that were based on the supplementary budget for
fiscal 2012 enacted in February 2013, 10.2 trillion yen or
about 2.1% of GDP.
— The government builds a “Growth Strategy Program” that
promotes private investment. “Japan Revitalization
Strategy” was released in June 2013. It sets many numerical
targets for various sectors in terms of increasing income and
promoting exports, etc.4
The first two “arrows” was acknowledged as Keynesian policy.
They aimed at returning Japan's economy to the sustainable
growth path by expanding the size of the aggregate demand. The
fiscal stimulus has worked to stimulate growth in 2013. And mone-
tary policy played an important role in stimulating economy. The
third arrow aimed at raising the potential growth in Japan.  
(2) New monetary policy under Abenomics
Abenomics influenced monetary policy before Mr. Abe became
Prime Minister on December 26, 2012. On December 20, the BOJ
decided to increase the size of its asset purchase by 10 trillion yen.
In January 2013, the BOJ declared that it is targeting 2% CPI infla-
tion. Also, the government and the BOJ issued a joint statement
declaring they would pursue “policy cooperation” to try to end
deflation.
In April 2013, under the direction of the newly appointed
Governor Haruhiko Kuroda, the BOJ decided to introduce the
“quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” (the QQE, same
hereafter), to achieve 2% inflation target. It consists of the
following 4 measures.5 
4. See Abe government, Japan Revitalization Strategy – JAPAN is BACK, overview set out on
June 14, 2013.
5. See the Bank of Japan, Introduction of the Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing, press
release of April 4, 2013. 
Mahito Uchida2461) The monetary base will increase at an annual pace of about
60-70 trillion yen. As a result, the amount outstanding of the
monetary base is expected to almost double in two years,
from 138 trillion yen at end-2012 to 270 trillion yen at end-
2014 (Figure1). The ratio of monetary base relative to GDP
will amount to 60% of GDP in 2014, compared with figures
of 17 to 18% for the euro-zone and US.
2) The BOJ increases Japanese Government Bond (JGB, same
hereafter) purchases. The BOJ buys indirectly equivalent to
70% of government bond every month (Figure 1). Also,
average remaining maturity of the bond extended from 3 to
7 years. Usually, this period is less than one year. It is because
a risk becomes larger as a period becomes long.
3) The BOJ purchases directly risk assets such as ETFs
(Exchange-Traded Funds) and J-REITs (Japan Real Estate
Investment Trusts) to lower risk premium of asset price.
4) The BOJ promised to continue the policy as long as it is
necessary for maintaining that target in a stable manner.
Figure 1. Monetary base in Japan and amount outstanding of BOJ’s holdings
Source: The Bank of Japan.
Mil yen 
End 2013
200 tril.yen
End 2013
140 tril.yen
Projection
in April 2013
Monetary base
Amount outstanding of the BOJ’s JGB holdings
End 2014
190 tril.yen
End 2014
270 tril.yen
End 2012
138 tril.yen
End 2012
91 tril.yen
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(Table 1). The monetary base has expanded and the amount
outstanding of JGBs held by the BOJ has also increased to more
than 140 trillion yen at end-2013. Also, the average remaining
maturity of the JGBs purchased has extended to about seven years. 
This policy will create 4 transmission channels:
1) channel to the long-term interest rate (entire yield curve
theoretically)
2) channel to stock prices and real estate prices
3) channel to portfolio adjustments and
4) channel to inflation expectations.
The main developments expected through the channels are as
follows. Through the first channel, firms' and households'
borrowing costs will be reduced. Through the second channel,
there will be a rise in firms' capital raising and fixed investment, as
well as in households' consumption and net exports. Through the
third channel, there will be a shift from investment in government
securities to banks' credit and investment in risk assets. Through
the fourth channel, real interest rates will decrease and support
spending activity in the economy. As a result, one could expect to
see positive effects transmit to developments in economic activity
and prices.
The new monetary policy has three features: drastic, political
intervention, and good timing.
Firstly, this policy is “Drastic”. It is drastic “Monetarism Solu-
tion”. They change operation target from interest rate to monetary
base. Whereas the deflation had continued for long time, the BOJ
raised inflation target from 1% to 2% in January 2013. Moreover,
their decision as a whole exceeded market expectations. The
Table 1. Expansion in the monetary base and JGB holdings                
Trillion yen
Mar-2013
(Introduction of the QQE)
End-2013      
Results   (initially planned)
Monetary base 146 202 200
the BOJ's JGB holdings 91 142 140
Source: The Bank of Japan.
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According to Governor Kuroda, the BOJ took very drastic measures
both in terms of the scale (quantity) and contents (quality) of its
asset purchases. 
Secondly, there is strong political intervention. Prime Minister
Abe forced the BOJ to target an inflation rate of 2 percent within
just two years. He insisted repeatedly that it would be necessary to
proceed with revising the BOJ law if the central bank cannot
produce results under its own mandate. He nominated advocate of
aggressive monetary easing as Governor Kuroda and Deputy
Governor Iwata.
Finally, the policy decision was made at the most effective
timing. At the installation of new leadership, many people were
observing the policy. Also, Japanese has much confidence in their
quick action. In the financial market, stock price had remained too
depressed for a long time compared with other countries. Conse-
quently, if there was any good news, the stock price in Japan would
have  a room to go up. Regards to real economy side, business fixed
investment had been restrained until last year because Japanese
firms have postponed them. They also waited for the good news.
(3) Effects of new monetary policy
This section examines the effects of new monetary policy that
have been observed in financial markets and economic activity.
Firstly, in the foreign exchange market, the yen's exchange rate
against the U.S. dollar and Euro has been depreciating since
November 2012 (before Prime Minister Abe took power), when it
was around 80 yen to the dollar, 100 yen to the euro and has been
around 100 yen to the dollar, 140 yen to the euro in December
2013. Monetary easing exerts pressure toward depreciation ceteris
paribus. As for the stock price, Nikkei average rose from around
9,400 yen in November 2012 to the 15,100-16,300 yen level in
December on the back of heightened expectations for economic
improvement and of the depreciation of the yen. Finally, long-
term interest rates rather rose a little since April. However, since
June it have been almost flat low level at around 0.7 percent, even
in the midst of rising overseas rates, due mainly to massive JGB
purchases and flexible market operations by the BOJ.
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economy has recovered. The GDP in Japan expanded in 2013 with
an average annualized growth rate of 3 percent on a quarter-on-
quarter basis, which was substantially above the potential growth
rate that is estimated to be around 0.5 percent. Exports has been
picking up during the process of adjusting the yen's appreciation.
Consumption has been on a rising trend and housing investment
increased. In Japan, we can usually see typical patterns in which
the increase in export induces the capital investment and then it
induces economic recovery as a whole. So, the development of
export is very important. The BOJ issued optimistic economic fore-
casts, saying it expected GDP in fiscal 2013 will rise 2.7%.6 In
addition, IMF has kept revising up its growth projection for Japan
while they have revised down its growth projection for the world. 
As for consumer prices, while the year-on-year rate of change in
the CPI (all items excluding fresh food, same hereafter) had been
negative until the spring of 2013, it reached zero percent in May
2013 and turned positive since June, exceeded 1 percent at the end
of year 2013, reflecting improvement in the economy and the
yen's depreciation. The BOJ has been strongly committed to
achieving the price stability target of 2 percent CPI inflation rate at
the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years:
in April 2015. 
According to the result in the Opinion Survey on the General
Public's Views and Behavior conducted by the BOJ in June 2013,
the share of respondents who expected that prices will go up one
year from now, excluding the effects of the consumption tax hike,
reached 80 percent. This suggests that the inflation expectations of
households are picking up. Furthermore, according to a survey
carried out by Nikkei Newspaper in May, 74% of the respondents
praised the QEE policy.
At least during nine months after the start of new monetary
policy, we can observe the positive reaction against the QEE.
6. See “Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices.” (October 2013). 
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(1) The monetary policy until 2012
This chapter deals with the question why previous monetary
policy (monetary policy until 2012) was not effective and why new
monetary policy is effective. 
a) Japan's economy after 1990
Before analyzing the issue, I provide an overview of Japan's
economy after 1990. This period is called as lost two decades in
Japan. Japan suffered from a prolonged recession. Over the same
period, Japan suffered from negative output gap except from 2005
to 2008. Japan experienced the collapse of the bubble in real estate
and stock prices in the early 1990s, the subsequent financial crisis
in the second half of the 1990s, the bursting of the U.S. IT bubble
in 2000, the Lehman shock in 2008, and the Great East Japan
Earthquake in 2011. When we calculate an economic growth rate
of Japan per ten years, the average growth rate falls greatly from
9% in the 1960s, and 3.5% in the 1980s to 1% since 1990s. 
Concerning price, the increase rate of CPI gradually dropped
and shifted to a continuous modest decline from 1998. In Japan,
deflation continues for 15 years. What is worse, average wages were
falling about 10% in the past ten years.
Under these circumstances, the BOJ started to lower the policy
interest rate since 1990 and it reached at zero in 1999. Therefore,
the BOJ faced a challenging situation. Under the zero interest rates
it becomes difficult to further enhance economy with the ordinary
policy. The BOJ had to take unconventional monetary policy.
These policies can be divided into three phases. 
— The first round of policy is called the quantitative easing (the
QE, same hereafter). It started in 2001 and ended in 2006
because CPI changed plus temporary. That is, the growth
rate of the CPI was within the range of 0-1 percent in 2006.
Therefore, in March, the BOJ concluded to exit the policy
since the conditions laid out in the commitment had been
fulfilled.
— The second round of monetary easing, the so-called the
comprehensive monetary easing (the CME, same hereafter),
starts from 2010 until the end of 2012. This time, not only
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mented the same policy.
— The third monetary policy (the QEE) stared with Abenomics
which have already been mentioned in the previous chapter.
The following part reviews the first two policies individually.
b) The QE policy
The QE policy consisted of the following three main elements.
First, the main operating target was shifted from the interest rate to
monetary base. The target was increased gradually through money
market operations by expanding excess reserves for private banks.
This policy contributed to rapid expansion of the monetary base.
The monetary base was expanded from 9 percent of GDP in 1999
to 22 percent of GDP by 2006. Second, the BOJ made a clear
commitment to maintaining this policy until the condition of the
CPI zero percent was met. This innovative monetary policy tool is
nowadays often referred to as “forward guidance”. Thirdly, the BOJ
increased the purchase of long-term JGBs, although a scale is not
so large at the initial stage. 
The overall assessment of the policy was made by Governor
Fukui in 2006.7 According to his conclusion, firstly, the policy
stabilized the financial system through the ample liquidity provi-
sion at a time when there were strong concerns over its stability. As
a result, it successfully avoided a repetition of the large-scale credit
crunch that occurred during the previous financial crises since
1997. Second, the policy created and maintained a very accommo-
dative environment that supported the recovery of Japanese firms.
Meanwhile, the BOJ stressed that the policy leads a side effect. That
is, owing to fewer arbitrage transactions and reduced demand for
fund-raising from the money market, there was the shrinkage of
the interbank markets. Thirdly, it was clear that such policy could
not promote active lending activities by banks. This was mainly
attributable to the size of negative shocks triggered by the bursting
of the bubble in the early 1990s and their subsequent impact on the
financial system. Policies for dealing with the deteriorating balance
7. Opening speech by Toshihiko Fukui, Governor of the Bank of Japan, at the 13th
International Conference hosted by the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of
Japan, June 1, 2006.
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loans were very slow. At the same time, the drag on aggregate
demand was severe owing to the balance sheet problems of firms
and three types of excesses; employment, investment, and debt.
Empirically, the effects of the QE policy can be examined by
decomposing the transmission mechanism into the following two
stages: the transmission mechanism from monetary easing to
financial and capital markets (first stage); and the mechanism from
the first stage to the real economy and prices (second stage). To
summarize the research results,8 on financial and capital markets
front, the effect of the policy was traced mainly through the
forward guidance policy by pushing the yield curve downward.
Meanwhile, the portfolio rebalance effect had mixed results,
depending on the types of assets. In particular, the purchase of
JGBs had little impact on lowering risk premiums. However, some
research analyses demonstrated the presence of the portfolio
rebalance effect through the channel of cross-border capital flows.
Namely, the QE policy induced capital outflows, whose funds were
then reinvested in Japanese stocks by foreign hedge funds, and
they contributed to raising those stock prices. With regard to the
second stage, some demonstrated that an expansion of the BOJ’s
balance sheet had a limited impact on aggregate demand and
prices. Other studies showed that there was a statistically
significant positive impact on industrial production, but no
statistically significant impact was found on the price.
c) The CME policy 
After Lehman shock, many central banks in advanced econo-
mies introduced the same unconventional policy in order to
support mal-functioning financial markets. Therefore, the second
policy strengthened the previous policy not only quantitatively
but also qualitatively. The reflection of previous policy was also
reflected. The difference between two policies was as follows. 
First, the BOJ buys a wider range of risk assets. This reflects the
view that the direct purchase of various financial assets may
8. See to Ugai (2007) for details. It surveys empirical analyses concerning the effects of the
quantitative easing policy. 
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premiums through greater portfolio rebalance and signaling effects.
Second, the policy directly aims at lowering longer-term
interest rates and risk premiums through an emphasis on asset
purchases. This is a sharp contrast from the previous policy, where
the main focus was on the size of the current account balance at
the BOJ. It is important to note that the volume of monetary base
is less emphasized. Instead, it is important to examine whether
there is room for further monetary easing by encouraging a further
decline in longer-term interest rates and risk premiums.
The effect of policy is almost same as a previous policy (Table 2).
On one hand, we can observe positive effects on financial markets.
Long-term bond yields had been declining. In particular, the yields
on JGBs up to three years have declined and flattened. Similarly,
yield spreads between corporate bonds and government bonds
Table 2. A effect of comprehensive monetary easing (CME) policy
Assess-
ment Explanation*
Reference
<2013/11>
Short-Term 
Interest Rates ○
Low, including those with longer maturities.
O/N call rate: 0.113%(2010/9), 0.089%(2012/10) <0.071%>
Long-Term 
Interest Rates ○
Yields on JGBs declined across all maturities.
3-year JGBs: 0.154%(2010/9)→ 0.100%(2012/10) 
10-year JGBs: 0.937%(2010/9)→ 0.784%(2012/10)
<0.108%>
<0.736%>
Issuing condi-
tions for bonds ○
Yield spreads had been stable at low levels
Spreads of Corporate Bond A-rated: 0.2～ 0.4% <0.2 ～ 0.3>
Stock price ×
Stock price remains stagnant.
Nikkei Stock Average: 
9,369 yen (2010/9)→ 8,928 yen (2012/10) <15,662 yen>
Real estate 
investment 
trust 
Δ
J-REITs 
Price: 935 (2010/9)→ 1,052(2012/10) 
Trading volume: 2,242 (2009)→ 2,664(2010)
<1,468>
<8,780>
Economic 
activity Δ
CME may be underpin Japan's economy
Real GDP (the year-on-year rate): 
0.3%(2011), 0.7%(2012)
(2013 OECD 
estimation) 
<1.8%>
Deflation ×
Consumer Price Index remained minus 
CPI (all less fresh food, the year-on-year rate) 
-0.2%(2011), -0.1%(2012) <1.2%>
Bank lending ×
Bank lending continued to weak 
Bank lending (the year-on-year rate):
-2.1%(2011), 1.2%**(2012) <3.6%>
* The data in September 2010 and in October 2012 were used, because CME started in October 2010 and “New
monetary policy” was expected since November 2012 when Prime Minister Noda stated that the diet would be
dissolved.
** Loans to electric power companies have increased since the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011.
Sources: Minister of Finance, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, The Bank of Japan, The Japanese Bank-
ers Association, Tokyo Stock Exchange, Inc. Nikkei Inc.
Mahito Uchida254corporate yields decreased across investment grades. The prices of
J-REITs surged and trading volume increased following the
announcement of BOJ’s CME policy. However, on the other hand,
on economic activity side, the effects are very limited. Although
CME policy contributed to underpinning Japanese economy, they
failed to exit from a period of deflation. Also, firms' demand for
external funds remained weak due to a decrease in firms' demand
for funds. 
(2) The difference between the previous policy 
and new policy
Theoretically, there is not so big difference between monetary
policies before 2012 and that since 2013, even if there is a differ-
ence of a scale. Among four measures of the QQE, the
“Quantitative monetary easing” in Japan has already adapted in
2001. The BOJ had already purchased not only Japanese govern-
ment bond but also a wider range of risk assets including
exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and Japan real estate investment
trusts (J-REITs). In the past, the BOJ promised to continue the
policy as long as it is necessary for maintaining that target in a
stable manner. The BOJ also attached great importance to its
communication with market participants. However, the previous
policy did not lead to economic recoveries, whereas the new policy
had big influence in the economy. 
As for financial market, both investors and financial institu-
tions investing in JGBs did not shift to risk assets such as stocks
and foreign-denominated bonds until 2012. However, this “port-
folio rebalancing effect” seems to begin to increase in 2013.9
Consequently, the yen depreciated. It induces increase of export.
Thus, in Japan, an economic virtuous circle is beginning to turn.
The current policy has a kind of “psychological impact”. The
Japanese are not usually interested in a monetary policy.
According to opinion survey conducted by BOJ in June 2013, when
asked about their interest in the BOJ, the proportions of respon-
dents who stated that they were “interested” in accounted for only
24 percent. However, this time, the media cannot stop talking
9. Since long-term interest rate is too low, the financial institution cannot acquire a profit
when they hold government bund.  
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in deflation. It can be said that the strong will of the BOJ got across
to people. In addition, the coordination with government may be
very important. 
Governor Kuroda pointed out the difference from a former
policy in his first speech in April 2013. Firstly, in the past, the BOJ
had taken its policy gradually while examining the effects of
monetary easing. However, there have been no concrete results.
Therefore, Governor Kuroda does whatever is necessary to over-
come deflation. Secondly, previously the BOJ hesitated to commit
inflation target, because they judged achieving 2% inflation target
in two years remains quite difficult only without structural reform
in Japan. Rather, they tried to avoid losing credibility from the
financial market. This time Governor Kuroda made a clear commit-
ment to achieving the price stability target of 2 percent at the
earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years.
Thirdly, Governor Kuroda showed its strong policy stance with
clarity. In this point, the previous Governor Shirakawa tried to
have a strong stance. However, regrettably, his strong feeling was
not able to reach understanding from Japanese, because his expla-
nation may rather be rested not on the facts but on theory or ideal.
(3) The cause of deflation
Fundamentally, there is the big difference concerning the
recognition about the cause of deflation between current Governor
Kuroda and Former Governor Shirakawa. The cause of deflation
and the actions of central bank to solve the deflation has been a
focus of policy debate in Japan,10 since the experience of deflation
combined with the zero interest problems was quite unique in
postwar history. 
Concerning the cause of deflation, there are some common
understandings such as negative output gap, appreciation of yen
and subsequent inflow of cheap imported goods, downward pres-
10. Nishizaki K., Sekine T., and Ueno Y. (2012) examine structural features that may explain
Japan’s chronic deflation, including the zero-lower bound on the nominal interest rate, public
attitudes toward the price level, central bank communication, weaker growth expectations
coupled with declining potential growth or the lower natural rate of interest, risk averse banking
behavior, deregulation, and the rise of emerging economies.
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distribution systems, declining trend for wages. 
However, about the fundamental factor of deflation, there was a
big difference between them. Governor Shirakawa accepts the
finance side as one cause of deflation. But he contended that the
zero-interest-rate policy already furnished enough funds to the
market. Therefore, he insisted that factors other than financial,
that is, structural problem such as demographic changes might
also influence deflation greatly. On the other hand, Governor
Kuroda insists that insufficient amount of money was the funda-
mental cause as deflation is ultimately a monetary phenomenon.
Consequently, monetary policy taken by the former Governor had
been rather restrictive. Governor Shirakawa strengthened his
monetary easing gradually while examining the effects. Instead of
taking radical policy, he introduced a new facility to support access
to lending for growth-oriented sectors. 
Many critics were calling for the policy conducted under
Governor Shirakawa to adopt more radical measure. They insisted
that the BOJ took the policy “too little, too late,”11 According to
them, the government also made a mistake in the turn of a policy.
Japanese should recover from deflation first, and then use a tax
hike if necessary.12 
The criticism that BOJ took the policy “too little, too late,” may
be right theoretically. However, in performing new policies or
unorthodox policy, the BOJ could not but become prudent in fact.
Unlike the theory at university, the BOJ is not allowed failure.
Article 2 of BOJ Law indicated as follows,
Currency and monetary control by the Bank of Japan shall be
aimed at achieving price stability, with which Japan's economy
will grow in a sustainable and balanced manner, thereby contri-
buting to the sound development of the national economy. 
Therefore, the policy of BOJ tends to be conservative. Unfortu-
nately, by means of the gradual policy, the central bank could not
change expectation of price among Japanese. 
11. See for example  Ito T. and Mishkin, F. (2006). They insisted BOJ can easily purchase CPs,
EFTs, REITs, and foreign currency denominated bonds.
12. A bill was passed in 2012 to raise Japan’s consumption tax from 5% to 8% by April 2014
and to 10% by October 2015. Hamada (2013) blamed the policy.
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(1) Sustainability of the new monetary policy
Theoretically, it takes about one year before a monetary policy
exerts an effect. This time, the QQE, with various economic
measures by Abenomics, has already started to exert effects as
mentioned in the previous chapter. The economic improvement in
Japan has continued more than the scenario of a central bank at
least until December 2013. As a result, many Japanese expect the
effect of Abenomics. It has been only nine months since the BOJ
introduced the QQE. That is, the QQE was still in its early stages.
Therefore, it is important to make this policy effect sustainable. 
The main goal of BOJ is to overcome deflation. The BOJ clearly
commits to achieve the price stability target of 2 percent CPI infla-
tion rate with a time horizon of about two years. However, another
important goal of BOJ is to have Japan’s economy return to
sustainable growth with price stability around 2%. The most signif-
icant contribution that central bank could make is to provide
accommodative financial conditions from the financial side.
Therefore, starting from dispelling deflationary expectations, the
BOJ intends to create and embed an economic virtuous cycle of a
moderate rise in prices, an increase in sales and profits, an increase
in wages, a boost in consumption, and a moderate rise in prices.
That is, the QQE policy effects will be sustainable if a price becomes
lastingly positive, which needs a durably positive output gap. 
In this point, one concern is the fact that “Growth Strategy
Program” of Abenomics remains weak. As the two consumption
tax hike is scheduled in Japan,13 the government may ask the BOJ
about the need for additional monetary easing because of “policy
cooperation”. However, an economic stimulus that is entirely
reliant on monetary easing will cause unexpected problems.
Lending activities have remained moderate under new monetary
policy. This mainly reflects a shortage of credit demand arising
from sluggish economic activities. In order to heighten the effect
of monetary policy, it is necessary for the government to carry out
bold structural reform like revolutionary monetary policy. Japan
13. The consumption tax hikes are scheduled for April 2014 and October 2015, from 5 percent
to 8 percent and 10 percent, respectively. 
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social areas. In addition to that, the following must be attained
with the result of reform: Firms should embark on new challenges
in broaden areas. And workers should move more smoothly into
businesses and industries with high growth potential in the labor
market. The Bundesbank also warned that the effects of Japan's
current economic policy would only be temporary unless more
specific reforms are carried out. 
(2) The overcoming of deflation
While the economic expansion in 2013 was real, there is yet a
little evidence that the two decade long deflation is over. The year-
on-year rate of change in the CPI turned positive since May 2013.
It is in the range of 0.5-1.0 percent in summer 2013. In November
2013, consumer prices rose at a somewhat accelerated pace to posi-
tive 1.2 percent. However, the recent pickup in prices attributes
mainly to a rise in energy prices and food prices on the back of the
yen's depreciation. The change in the CPI that excludes food and
energy stood still at low level of 0.3 percent. It is not certain
whether the rise of CPI will accelerate further.14 Moreover, even if
the BOJ achieves its inflation target, it could not be appreciated as
a success if it is the result of the devaluation of the yen. If Japanese
start to anticipate higher prices and modify their behavior accord-
ingly, inflation could become a reality. However, if price inflation
is not accompanied by wage inflation, the pass-through from infla-
tion expectations to consumer spending may be broken. 
The BOJ has made a clear commitment to achieving the price
stability target of 2 percent with a time horizon of 2015. Also, the
BOJ estimates that CPI will reach 1.9 percent in 2015.15 Governor
Kuroda shows strong confidence in the estimation. However, we
should also observe that the forecasts of the nine board members
ranged widely from 0.9 percent to 2.2 percent. It is true that among
deflationary factors, appreciation of yen stopped. Output gap has
been reduced. However, downward pressure from deregulation and
distribution system seems to continue. We are yet to see any
14. According to the monthly survey by the Cabinet Office's Economic Planning Association in
January 2014, Economists on average expect core CPI to increase only 0.97% in fiscal 2015 and
wages to increase only 0.3% in fiscal 2014.
15. See “Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices.” (October 2013, the Bank of Japan).
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turing sectors. Therefore, achieving 2% inflation in two years
remains yet uncertain. 
We might not adhere to inflation 2% of a level. There has been
no in-depth discussion about the level of target in fact. If people's
expectations change from deflationary to inflationary, their behav-
iors change, and developments in the economy as a whole would
start to change. It can be assessed that this policy is successful if
Japanese economy goes into orbit of sustainable growth. 
As for inflation expectation, the most important point of the
QEE is to dispel the deflationary expectations that had been firmly
embedded after nearly 15 years of deflation, and to generate mild
and stable inflationary expectations. Many indicators suggest that
inflation expectations have been picking up in the market, as well
as among firms and households. Deputy Governor Iwata insisted
as the following.16
Intrinsically, monetary policy can elicit its effects through the
public's expectations. In the initial stage of the QEE, the impor-
tant key is for the public to expect that prices will go up. Going
through this process, demand will increase and prices will start
to rise in reality toward the price stability target of 2 percent.
This in turn will reinforce the public's expectations that prices
will rise stably in the future, thus contributing to low and stable
expected real interest rate. 
Until December 2013, Japanese economy has improved as the
BOJ explained. However, according to results of Opinion Survey on
the General Public's Views and Behavior in June 2013, the propor-
tions of respondents who stated that they were “interested” in the
activities of BOJ accounted for 24 percent in June 2013, increasing
only 1% from 23 percent in December. In addition, the proportion
of respondents who described the explanations to the public by
BOJ as “unclear” and “clear” accounted for 58 percent and
6 percent respectively (Figure 2). We can see little improvement in
this field. It is true that the expectation of inflation changed among
some investors. However, at a present stage, it cannot be confirmed
whether the expectation of inflation has spread among Japanese.
16. See Iwata, (2013).
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The QEE entails some risks. This section considers the issues
such as the impact on the government bond markets, the impact
on other financial market and an outflow of money to overseas.
a) An impact on the government bond markets
First is a formation of a bubble on the government bond
markets. It is well-known that Japan has the highest debt to GDP
ratio in advanced economy, much higher than some European
countries such as Greece and Ireland, which have been in sover-
eign debt crisis since 2010.The government bonds and borrowings
in Japan has increased sharply from 643 trillion yen in 2002 to
997 trillion yen in 201217 due to the increase in growing spending
Figure 2. Results of the opinion survey on the general public's views 
and behavior (June 2013)
Source: the Bank of Japan.
17. They include “Government bonds” (812 trillion yen), “Fiscal investment and loan program
bonds” (113 trillion yen) and “Borrowings” (54 trillion yen). 
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resulting from economic downturn. The International Monetary
Fund published the report in 2010 saying that Japan’s government
debt would reach 250% of GDP in 2015. However, yields on
10 year JGBs remains low at a historical low level of 0.7 percent in
2013. There are mainly two reasons. First, there is no safest asset in
Japan than JGBs. Secondly, large-scale JGB purchases by the BOJ
under QQE has exerted downward pressure.  
In Japan, more than 90% of JGBs are held by domestic inves-
tors. Japan’s household financial assets (at 1,590 trillion yen in
June 2013) are the second largest in the world after the United
States. However, it has increased by only 178 trillion yen in the
past 10 years. As a result, if government debt in Japan continues to
increase at the present pace, it will be difficult for domestic inves-
tors to purchase further JGBs in the near future. Concerning the
sale of JGBs, Japan will be forced to depend on foreign investors.18
Another possibility is the holdings of JGBs by the central bank.
However, the current money policy has already been extraordinary
in that the BOJ buys more than 70 percent of government bonds
issued every month. If the BOJ were to further increase the volume
of government bonds it purchases, it could cause market functions
to fail, lead to the interpretation that the central bank is forced to
make up for the budget deficit, and eventually cause the credit
rating of Japanese government bonds to decline. This could end up
sharply increasing interest rates. In order to avoid a doubt
regarding the BOJ's increasing purchases of JGBs as financing fiscal
deficits, it is necessary for the government to clearly show the
future course of fiscal consolidation and steadily make progress to
reform the fiscal structure. 
Even if these problems do not occur, the financial market price
in 2013, that is the combination of depreciation of yen, a low long-
term interest rate and the rise of stock prices, did not have compat-
ibility. Theoretically, long-term interest rates (il) are considered to
be determined mainly by two factors: first, the forecast of future
short-term interest rates or the future inflation rate (pe), and
18. Foreign investors have already increased their JGB holdings. China became the largest
holder of JGB since 2010 (18 trillion yen in 2011).
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term bond (riskp).  
il = p
e + riskp
In 2012, the prices of Japan had been minus 0.1%. The long-
term interest rate was 0.7%. As a result, it is guessed that a risk
premium had been around 0.8%. On the other hand, suppose if
the BOJ attains 2% of inflation target in two years, and if the policy
actions by the BOJ are intended to lower interest rates at the
current 0.7% level, risk premium should be minus 1.3%. It is not
sustainable. When a central bank purchases government bonds in
the bond market and absorbs the amount of bonds in circulation,
the bond price will rise and the yield will decline. However, the risk
premium cannot become minus for a long time. From April to June
2013, the higher inflation expectation leaded to the rising of long-
term interest rates.19 
If the government bond market crashed, fiscal deficit will get
worse. The BOJ holds a massive portfolio of JGBs. It raises doubts
about the viability of the BOJ’s balance-sheet problem. Also, it is
private financial institutions that hold a massive portfolio of JGBs.
Therefore, large losses on the profit will arise for financial institu-
tions again. Governor Kuroda said in May 2013 that estimates by
the BOJ showed a rise in interest rates by around 1-3 percentage
points would not cause major concerns over Japan's financial
system, as long as the rise is accompanied by improvements in the
economy. However, there is another forecast by think-tank that
Japanese banks will lose profit if the rise in interest rates is not
accompanied by improvements in the economy and is driven by
heightened concern over Japan's fiscal deficit.20
b) An impact on other financial market
The financial markets may become unstable if the QEE is based
on the market’s illusion. 
19. In this point, Krugman (2013) insisted that as long as Japanese short-term rates are up
against the zero lower bound, long-term JGB rates does not rise much as a result of expected
inflation, and they might even fall slightly if the BOJ gets perceived as less ready to raise rates
in future.
20. See BNP Paribas, (2013).
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and a Euro in 6 months. Theoretically, according to Purchasing
Power Parity calculated by the Japan-U.S. consumer price index
ratio, one dollar corresponds in the second half of the level of
90 yen.21 The exchange rate of the yen was around 100 yen per
dollar in December 2013. It can be judged that the current exchange
rate of the yen stands within appropriate range. Rather, the Japanese
yen is bought too much in a foreign exchange market until 2012.
That may be why the BOJ often use the expression “the process of
adjusting the yen's appreciation” instead of the depreciation.
As for the stock price, after two “lost decades”, it surged by more
than 60% during one year since the beginning of the year 2013.
We can see some analysis that saying there are many foreigner's
stock trade transactions during the period. The volatility (model
free implied volatility; MFIV) of Japanese stock prices has remained
at a high level in 2013 relative to volatility in overseas markets.22
Although it is dependent on the Japanese economy of the future,
stock market seemed overheat in 2013. In fact, the stock market
repeated fluctuation since June 2013. Also, in the J-REIT market,
prices rose substantially after end-2012 against the background of
an improving outlook for conditions in the business office market.
After a correction phase entered in May 2013, the market picked up
again in September thanks to Tokyo’s selection to host the 2020
Olympics. The Tokyo Stock Exchange REIT Index delivered a
35.9% price return in 2013, their highest annual returns in the
index’s history.
On the other hand, the real estate market remains stable as a
whole, although the monetary easing is gradually raising land
prices in some urban areas such as Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya. In
July 2013 it fell by 1.8% in residential areas and 2.1% in commer-
cial areas from figures posted the year before. Japanese people
remain prudent in real estate deals by experience of the collapse of
the 'bubble' economy in 1990. 
21. PPP is calculated using Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, “Consumer Price
Index” and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index.”
22. See in detail BOJ, (2013).
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The QEE policy does not only cause stock price and JGB in
Japan to sharply rise. It could also increase risks pertaining to over-
seas markets. Japanese investors started to increase holdings of
overseas debt since 2013. Investors in US intend to borrow yen in
order to buy higher yielding assets. In fact, junk-bond markets
overseas have been expanding since April 2013. The U.S. central
bank has warned about such invisible risks.
Moreover, it seems that the money in Japan is flowing also into
Asian countries mostly by way of the U.S. There are few signs of
asset bubbles forming in Asia due to Japan's massive monetary
easing. As far as recovery in the Japanese economy is expected, the
currency wars don’t occur. The BOJ's monetary policy is focused on
achieving the domestic objective to lead Japan's economy toward
overcoming deflation. Achieving this goal will eventually provide
the global economy with favorable effects. It seems that the inter-
national community shares a common understanding on these
points. However, the BOJ should monitor whether its monetary
easing could have an unintended spillover effect on emerging
economies carefully.
4. Independence of the Central Bank
When we consider the role of a central bank from a long-term
viewpoint, the issue of the independence of a central bank is
important. Actually, the BOJ law grants the central bank indepen-
dence from the government. Historical experience shows that
central bank independence is of crucial importance for lasting
price stability and growth. For example, the lesson from Bank of
England shows that wide operational and financial independence
given to monetary and credit policy in the public interest subjects
the central bank to incentives detrimental for macroeconomic and
financial stability. An independent central bank needs the double
discipline of a priority for price stability and bounds on expansive
credit initiatives to secure its promise for stabilization policy.23
Against those backdrops, central banks are nowadays granted
formal independence. If central banks are to pursue price stability,
23. See Goodfriend M., (2012).
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long-term perspective, away from short-term concerns. This is
legally secured by recognizing the independence of central banks
in national laws. Moreover, no central bank of advanced econo-
mies loses independence.
However, Japan has not been able to escape from a vicious cycle
of deflation and stagnant economic activity for the past 15 years.
Therefore, Prime Minister Abe repeated it would be necessary to
revise the BOJ law if the central bank cannot produce results under
its own mandate. At the time of deflation, the aim towards the
overcoming the deflation is in the same direction between the
government and the central bank. However, at the time of infla-
tion, the government focused on growth, whereas the central bank
should focus on price stability. The BOJ says repeatedly that they
carefully examine risk factors such as market conditions and devel-
opments in economic activity and prices. However, the concern
that the policy measures of the BOJ would be delayed remains.
Once the independence is thrown into doubt, the prevailing
expectation formation processes may undergo fundamental
change to a bad direction of inflation. 
5. Conclusion
It has been 9 months since the BOJ introduced the QQE.
Overall, the QEE under Abenomics has already provided a consid-
erable stimulus to the economy. Taking into account Japan's
current situation of protracted deflation, it might be confirmed
that this kind of policy should be effective. There has been a favor-
able turn not only in financial markets and corporate finance but
also in the public's expectation. In a real economy side, not only
public spending but also export and personal consumption has
increased. A cause of bold monetary easing, the real interest rate
fell and it caused a weak yen. Consequently, the export increased.
The psychological impact of the monetary policy has played the
large role in increasing in personal consumption. At least until
January 2014, the scenario of aiming to achieve 2 percent CPI
inflation materializes in line with the intended path. The public
gradually senses this development and raises its level of confidence
regarding the economic activity and price outlooks.  
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commitment that it is responsible for achieving the price stability
target of 2 percent, and that this is accompanied by concrete
measures underpinning such a commitment. In addition, the QEE
is performed in cooperation with the government. In order to revi-
talize the economy which has fallen into this vicious cycle of
deflation and a decline in aggregate demand, it showed that the
bold monetary easing is effective at least in the short run as a
means of stopping the continued fall in prices and bringing
economic activity to the level that should have been achieved. 
However, there is also a limit in a monetary policy. The base
money supplied by the BOJ would be more effective if the govern-
ment proceeds an accelerated depreciation scheme for capital
investment or a bold plan for deregulation. To maintain positive
output gap, growth strategy plays an important role. Abenomics,
which consists of three policy arrows, is an appropriate policy
package. However, among three arrows, while monetary policy
and fiscal policy are already being implemented, the third have
been slow in coming. The obstacles of government restrictions,
anticompetitive laws and regulations, bureaucratic interference
and inflexibility, relatively high taxes have weakened profitability,
international competitiveness, and growth from vasst swaths of
Japan’s economy. If these obstacles cannot be substantially
lowered or removed, it will be hard to see how Japan can avoid
further economic marginalization. 
It is expected that many side effects arise by the present policy.
The BOJ has to perform the policy over side effects. Among some
issues, most concerned is the adherence of inflation target of two
percent. The BOJ promises to achieve an inflation target of 2% in
April 2015. If the BOJ continues to stick to its 2 percent inflation
target strictly, the central bank may not only lose its flexibility in
its policy implementation. The goal is to produce real growth not
to produce inflation. It is true that the change of deflation antici-
pation is mostly important. However, if Japanese get the growth,
the aim is attained. Then, it should be reversed as soon as the
sustainable growth is achieved. The BOJ would lose its credibility
as the central bank if it lets its desire to much to achieve the infla-
tion target of 2 percent. 
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